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The Rise of Renvoi in Australia: Creating the Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
One of the few remaining areas of uncertainty in the conflict of laws is the problem of conflicting choice 
of law rules in different jurisdictions.  One of the controversial doctrines to deal with this issue is renvoi.  
The doctrine enjoys some support from the judiciary and academia, but has also been subject to great 
criticism and resistance.  The High Court recently had occasion to consider the doctrine and accepted it 
into Australian law in a controversial decision.  This article considers the doctrine in the light of the 
recent decision.  The author believes, as others such as Mortensen and Keyes1 have noted, that there are 
better ways to resolve this problem other than by accepting the renvoi doctrine, but given that the High 
Court has elsewhere in choice of law jurisprudence rejected these other ways, it is better to apply the 
renvoi principle than not apply it.  This article explains the different approaches and the High Court 
decision, considers philosophical criticisms of the renvoi doctrine and whether they can be met, and 
explores the relationship between renvoi and a conflicts doctrine with which the author has some 
sympathy, interest analysis.  This is designed to provide some theoretical framework for the possible 
eventual acceptance of the renvoi doctrine in Australia.  Unlike courts in other jurisdictions, Australian 
courts have not yet explicitly applied interest analysis in our choice of law jurisprudence.  The issue of 
the proof of foreign law also features in the discussion. 
 
Background 
Assume that Gordon, a New South Wales citizen, dies in a car accident in Quebec, Canada, involving 
another Australian tourist.  Australian law determines liability and quantum of damages (if any) by 
reference to the law of the place of the wrong.  Canadian law determines these issues based on the 
residence of those involved in the case.  Action is commenced in an Australian court. 
 
Should the court: 
(a) Refer to the internal rules (ie excluding choice of law rules) of Canadian law to resolve the 
issues?  This is known as rejecting the renvoi and is the approach that garners most support 
among courts and the academy;2 
                                                 
1 Reid Mortensen ‘Troublesome and Obscure: The Renewal of Renvoi in Australia’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private International 
Law 1; Mary Keyes ‘The Doctrine of Renvoi in International Torts: Mercantile Mutual Insurance v Neilson (2005) 13 Torts 
Law Journal 1 
2 This approach was suggested in Re Annesley [1926] Ch 692, 709 (although the judge then applied the foreign court theory) 
and In re Tallmadge (1909) 181 NYS 336.  Lorenzen supports this approach:  see Ernest Lorenzen ‘The Renvoi Doctrine in 
the Conflict of Laws – Meaning of the Law of a Country’ (1917) 27 Yale Law Journal 509 where he claimed that accepting 
the renvoi and allowing another state to dictate the applicable law would be an abdication of sovereignty and a failure on the 
part of a State to discharge the duties it owes to its residents (523); ‘The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law’ 
(1910) 10 Columbia Law Review 190; Joseph Cormack ‘Renvoi, Characterisation, Localisation and Preliminary Question in 
the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 54 Southern California Law Review 221; Morris ‘The Law of the Domicile’ (1937) 18 British 
Yearbook of International Law 32, 39; Cheshire Private International Law (1938) p50 (2nd ed) dismisses the vagaries of the 
remarkable doctrine as illogical.  Some connect the refusal to consider the foreign choice of law rules with the now 
discredited vested rights theory ie that the forum applies its own law to vindicate rights that have vested in the law of another 
jurisdiction:  Kermit Roosevelt ‘Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence By Means of Language’ (2004) 80 
Notre Dame Law Review 1821,1836; Joseph Beale A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) p53, Dean Falconbridge 
‘Renvoi and Succession to Movables’ (1930) 46 Law Quarterly Review 485, Schreiber ‘The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-
American Law’ (1918) 31 Harvard Law Review 523, 570-571, Frederick Pollock ‘The Renvoi in New York’ (1920) 36 Law 
Quarterly Review 91; Mendelssohn-Bartholdy Renvoi in Modern English Law (1937); Ernst Schreiber Jr ‘The Doctrine of the 
Renvoi in Anglo-American Law’ (1917-1918) 31 Harvard Law Review 523.  Others have suggested a true vested rights 
theory would consult foreign choice of law rules in order to determine whether foreign rights in fact had vested:  Walter 
Wheeler Cook The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 19 (1942).  Both the First and Second Restatements of 
the Conflict of Laws apply a general rule of rejecting the renvoi:  Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) s7, except in relation 
(b) Refer to both the internal and choice of law rules of Canada, following the reference back to 
Australian law (single renvoi theory)(the reference back could only be to Australian internal law, 
to avoid the problem of infinite regression where one system is constantly referring to another in 
attempting to determine which law applies to the scenario)3 
(c) Do what the Canadian court would do in resolving the dispute? (foreign court or double renvoi 
theory)(again if the Canadian court would refer to the law of another country to do this, this 
reference should only be to that country’s internal laws, to avoid the infinite regression problem 
highlighted above)(this approach would consider Canada’s approach to renvoi problems).4  This 
approach requires the court of the forum to approximate its decision as closely as possible to that 
which would have been reached by the court of the foreign system, given its choice of law and 
renvoi rules.5 
 
This article will focus on the resolution of the renvoi question in tort (which is considered contentious) 
rather than on the exceptional areas where it is generally accepted that renvoi will apply.6
 
Neilson 
Before considering the jurisprudential issues with renvoi that arise, it is necessary to provide a synopsis 
of the important recent High Court decision in this area.  The decision is important because until the case 
had been brought, there was extremely scant reference to the renvoi doctrine in the Australian cases.  
The doctrine had apparently not been considered in any detail by the High Court; it had been recognised 
by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Simmons v Simmons,7 though it remains doubtful whether 
the court was applying the single or the double renvoi theory.  Walsh J in Kay’s Leasing Corp v 
Fletcher8 thought renvoi might apply to contract cases.   
 
It is clear that the High Court’s decision in this case does not present a ringing endorsement of the renvoi 
doctrine – the Court does not accept that the principle is one of universal application in the realm of the 
choice of law field – at least at this time.  Several judges do not specifically refer to the renvoi doctrine 
or concede that they are applying the doctrine.  However, the case is seen as an important one in the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
to title to land and divorce,  Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws s8(1), as does the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK) s9(5) 
3 This approach appears in for example Collier v Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt 855; 163 ER 608 (though there the English court said it 
would have to decide the case as if it were the Belgian court); it is the approach taken by most civil law countries, and is 
advocated by Thomas Cowan ‘Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy’ (1938) 87 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 34.  The author accepts that the cutting of the references back here is not the only approach possible, and accepts one 
of the criticisms of renvoi is that unless this somewhat arbitrary decision is made, there could be an endless stream of 
references from the legal principles of one system to that of another.  The author does not maintain that it is ‘logical’ to stop 
after the first reference, but adopts the view of Griswold that a stop must be found somewhere and this is a reasonable point at 
which to do so:  see Erwin Griswold ‘Renvoi Revisited’ (1938) 51 Harvard Law Review 1165, 1192-1193 
4 This approach appears in In Re Johnson (Roberts v Attorney-General) [1903] 1 Ch 821; Armitage v Attorney-General 
[1906] P 135, Simmons v Simmons (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 419, where the court enquired as to the conflicts of laws principles 
of New Caledonia; Re Ross [1930] Ch 377; Maugham J in Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch 259; Wynn-Parry J in Re Duke of 
Wellington [1947] Ch 506; Scarman J in The Estate of Fuld, Deceased (No 3) [1968] P 675, Dupuy v Wurtz (1873) 53 N Y 
556, 573; Harral v Harral (1884) 39 NJ Eq 279, and Ross v Ross (1894) 25 Can SC 307.  It has the support of Erwin 
Griswold ‘Renvoi Revisited’ (1938) 51 Harvard Law Review 1165, 1182.  Dicey always maintained that the law of a country 
as applied by the English cases included its conflict of laws rules: Albert Dicey Conflict of Laws (1896) 77 (1st ed)  In Frere v 
Frere (1847) 5 Notes of Cases 593, the decedent died domiciled in Malta, leaving a will made in England.  The will was valid 
according to English law, but not Maltese.  Maltese courts would have upheld the will because it was made according to the 
law of the place of execution.  The English court followed this rule, upholding the will.  To like effect, in some cases the 
forum court has stayed the matter until the same matter has been pronounced upon by the foreign court:  see for example De 
Bonneval v De Bonneval 1 Curteis 856 (Ecc Ct 1838).  This may be taken as implicit support for renvoi.   
5 As Kirby J put it in Neilson, ‘how the foreign court itself would have resolved the substantive rights of the parties in an 
hypothetical trial conducted before it’, rather than stepping into the shoes of the foreign judge and exercising the discretion. 
6 These exceptional areas are traditionally, at least in the United States, seen to be immovable land and divorce, due to the 
practical difficulty of not recognising the choice of law rules of a foreign state in these areas  -  see Restatement, Conflict of 
Laws (1934) s8, although some quibble with the description of these areas as exceptions:  see Joseph Cormack ‘Renvoi, 
Characterisation, Localisation and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws’ (1941) 54 Southern California Law Review 
221, 264-266. 
7 (1917) SR (NSW) 419 
8 (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 195; refer also to Barcelo v Electroyltic Zinc (1932) 48 CLR 391 
development of the jurisprudence regarding renvoi because it directly considers the question of the 
extent to which Australian choice of law rules require application of the law of another country.  The 
judgments in Neilson can be seen as pragmatic ones achieving what many would believe to be the 
‘correct’ result, and to the extent that the majority accepted the reference back to Australian law, 
enlivening the possibility of further development of the renvoi doctrine, rather than a strong assertion of 
the intellectual merits of the renvoi doctrine.   
 
The opportunity for the High Court to consider renvoi arose in the case of Neilson v Overseas Projects 
Corporation of Victoria Ltd9, which involved a claim made by the appellant against Overseas Projects 
Corporation (OPC) for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of OPC’s negligence.  The 
appellant’s husband worked for OPC and had travelled with his family to China to work on a project for 
his employer.  OPC provided accommodation for the family.  One night, the appellant was injured when 
she fell down stairs connecting the upper and lower levels of the accommodation.  It was suggested the 
stairs were dangerous as they did not have a handrail.  The appellant and respondent were both 
Australian residents. 
 
According to the relevant rules in the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC (General Principles), 
the laws of China were to apply to civil activities carried out within that country, unless otherwise 
stipulated.  Article 146 stated that in a claim for compensation for damages resulting from an 
infringement of rights, the law of the place where the infringement occurred should be applied.  The 
article goes on to provide that where both parties are nationals of the same country, the law of their own 
country may be applied.  Article 136 of the General Principles specified a limitation period of one year 
for demands for compensation for bodily harm, extendable in special circumstances.  Regarding the 
Australian rules, the High Court had recently in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang10 
(Zhang) established the Australian choice of law rule that the law of the place of the wrong should 
determine liability in such cases, without exception.  The relevant limitation period in Australia would 
typically be six years for a personal injuries claim.   
 
It was not clear whether China accepted the renvoi doctrine.  It was not clear on the face of Article 146 
whether the reference to the legal rules of another country included only that country’s substantive law 
(ie single renvoi) or also that country’s choice of law rules (double renvoi).  The case therefore also 
raised the important issue of the need for proof of foreign law, and what should happen when evidence 
of foreign law was not as strong as one would like.   
 
Double Renvoi Approach Favoured in Neilson 
Gleeson CJ in effect applied the third approach, consistent with the object of choice of laws principles, 
by deciding the present case in the same way as it would be decided in China.11  Admittedly, there was 
little evidence presented to the court to show why in a case such as this the Chinese court would exercise 
its discretion and apply the foreign law.  Gleeson CJ concluded the evidence, such as it was, was ‘barely 
sufficient, but just enough’ to support that view.  He said it was plausible that Article 146 called for a 
consideration of what was just and reasonable in the circumstances.  Further (reminiscent of interest 
analysis), Gleeson CJ opined that the Chinese authorities were ‘totally unaffected by the outcome of the 
litigation, no Chinese interests are involved, and there appears to be no reason of policy for a Chinese 
court to resist the proposition that the rights and obligations of the parties should be determined 
according to the law of Western Australia’.12  Gleeson CJ did not find it useful to rely on a suggested 
assumption that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was assumed foreign law is the same as 
Australian law.  He found such a rule could not apply here because there clearly were differences 
between the relevant principles in China and Australia.13
 
                                                 
9 (2006) 221 ALR 213 
10 (2002) 210 CLR 491 
11 217-218 
12 219 
13 218; McHugh J agreed 223 
Gummow and Hayne JJ, agreed with the double renvoi approach for reasons of certainty and 
simplicity.14    This approach was, they said, most consistent with the High Court’s recognition of the 
law of the place of the wrong as the dominant factor in multistate tort cases.15  These judges avoided the 
infinite regression problem identified by McHugh J by concluding that if the foreign law referred back to 
the law of the forum (here Australia), this was a reference to the internal law of Australia.16  These 
judges rallied against one single approach to renvoi problems – each area had to be considered on its 
merits.  They expressed concern that the approach chosen avoid incentives for forum shopping, so that 
as far as possible, the rights and obligations of the parties should be the same regardless whether the 
dispute was litigated.17
 
Accepting that the parties did not lead evidence as to how Article 146 had been applied by the Chinese 
courts, these judges nevertheless concluded that ‘the trial judge was bound to conclude that Chinese law, 
when applied to the facts of this case, would look to the law of the nationality or domicile of the 
parties’.18  In justifying this position, the judges called into play the presumption that foreign law is the 
same as the local law, and that Article 146 should be interpreted as would an Australian statute, by 
focusing on the scope and objects for which the discretion was conferred.19  The judges referred to the 
fact that all parties to the dispute were Australian; the only connecting factor between China and the 
events was that they occurred in that country.20
 
Kirby and Heydon JJ agreed with the double renvoi approach.21  Kirby J accepted the evidence of the 
Chinese legal expert in this case that time limitation periods in China were substantive rather than 
procedural.22  The expert said he was not aware of any cases where the exception to the standard 
limitation period had been applied.  As a result, the court should have applied the Chinese limitation 
period of one year, with the result that the action here was statute-barred. 
 
Given the absence of evidence as to how Article 146 would be applied by a Chinese court, Kirby J was 
not prepared to assume that Chinese law would adopt similar principles as an Australian court in 
interpreting the Article, or that the law of China was the same as the law of Australia.23  Such a 
presumption might be possible in relation to two common law countries, but not given China’s very 
different legal history and development.  The plaintiff here had the burden of proving foreign law, and 
had failed to do so.  Kirby J was not satisfied with the concession by the expert that it was possible that a 
Chinese court might, in interpreting Article 146, apply Australian law.  Kirby J also disputed the view of 
other judges that no Chinese interests were at stake in this scenario.24
 
Single Renvoi 
Callinan J applied this approach, accepting the reference by the Chinese choice of law rules to 
Australian law, and applying Australian domestic law, based on his view of what the Chinese court 
would likely have done in all the circumstances.25  Callinan J noted that according to the evidence, it 
                                                 
14 236 
15 239 
16 238-239 
17 235 
18 242 
19 242-243 
20 243 
21 257,283 
22 258 
23 261-262 
24 265-266.  He cited relevant interests to include (1) the self-respect of a newly emergent polity in building its own legal 
systems (2) lack of expertise of the Chinese court on foreign law (3) the need in China (as in Australia) to prove a foreign law 
where it is to be applied, and the practical availability and cost of such an exercise (4) the differing legal and cultural attitudes 
to strict time limits and the extinguishment of time-barred proceedings (5) the avoidance of manifest dis-uniformity of 
outcomes in proceedings decided by the same court (6) the criticism, inherent in the appellant’s claim, of the Chinese builders 
and providers of the allegedly defective dwelling (7) the risk of joinder of those State agencies in the proceedings, if the 
proceedings were to be brought in China. 
25 278 
was unlikely that a Chinese court would have exercised its discretion to remove the statute-bar 
preventing this action, as being out of time.  However, in the end for Callinan J this was a moot point.  
Having presumed that the Chinese principles of statutory interpretation were the same as those in 
Australia,26 he applied the kinds of factors that an Australian court would take account of in deciding 
whether or not to exercise the discretion to apply the law of a particular country.27    
 
No Renvoi 
Troubled as he was by the infinite regression that may occur with the application of the double renvoi 
doctrine, McHugh J (dissenting) considered the options to be either the acceptance of single renvoi or 
rejection of the entire doctrine of renvoi.  His starting premise was that the court must resolve the appeal 
by applying as much of the law of the place of the wrong as possible.28  He saw this as inconsistent with 
the foreign court theory ie that the court should take into account what the foreign jurisdiction would do 
if the matter were to be litigated there.29  In order to have as much of the law of the place of the wrong 
applying as possible, he rejected the renvoi.  In other words, when Australian law refers to the law of 
China to resolve the dispute, it refers to the law of China minus its choice of law rules; in other words 
Chinese substantive law (including its limitation period) should apply to resolve the dispute.30  McHugh 
J was not convinced either that if a Chinese court had heard the matter, it would necessarily have applied 
Australian law to resolve the dispute. 
 
Having considered the High Court view,31 we turn to a critique of aspects of the High Court’s 
acceptance of renvoi in this case, and of the renvoi doctrine more generally.  We attempt to place the 
judgement into the broader context of conflict of laws scholarship.  It is suggested that the Court might 
be informed in its future development of the doctrine by the broader scholarly debate in choice of law, 
including issues such as forum-bias, interest analysis, proof of foreign law, and previous judicial and 
scholarly pronouncements on the issues that confronted the court in Neilson.  It is noteworthy that the 
Court in its decision by and large bypassed this debate.  It is thought that by engaging in this debate, the 
roots of renvoi in Australia might be grounded in firmer soil. 
 
(1) The High Court’s desire to apply Forum Law in this case 
It seems quite clear that members of the High Court were determined in this case to apply Australian law 
to the dispute.32  Indeed, some critics of the renvoi doctrine see it as an escape device to allow the forum 
court to apply its own law.33  As Mortensen notes 
                                                 
26 275 
27 These were stated to include (a) the absence of any question of liability of a Chinese national or authority (b) the fact that 
liability, if found, would be the liability of an authority or company of a polity of Australia (c) that there is no allegation of a 
breach of any written building laws or laws of occupiers’ liability in China (d) that the relationship between the parties came 
into existence in Australia (e) that the court might need to construe a contract made in Australia (f) that the expenses and 
standards of treatment of the appellant would be Australian (g) that Chinese nationals would not be required to give evidence 
(except perhaps as to the effect of Chinese law); and (h) that the outcome of the case on the application of Australian law 
would be of no or little relevance or interest to the Chinese law makers or reformers (276).  However as Briggs notes, this 
approach is odd because there are no rules of Australian statutory construction applicable to the Chinese law in this case.  He 
cites Damberg v Damberg, where the New South Wales Court of Appeal refused to apply an Australian rule, that an illegal 
transaction may be enforced where the illegality lies in an infringement of revenue law which has been disclosed and 
remedied, to a contract to which German law applied but where relevant German law on point was not proved: (2001) 52 
NSWLR 492: ‘’The Meaning and Proof of Foreign Law’ (2006) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 1, 5 
28 224 
29 227 
30 229 
31 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts reached the same conclusion when considering the same Chinese article in Lou ex rel 
Chen v Ottis Elevator Co [2004] WL 504697, involving a United States citizen injured in China by an escalator manufactured 
in the United States.  The court held that Massachusetts had a more significant relationship with the parties than China did, 
and doubted, given the terms of Article 146, whether a Chinese court would apply Chinese law to resolve the case. 
32 As Reid Mortensen puts it ‘It is difficult to leave a close reading of Neilson without getting the impression that the High 
Court made all efforts to have the lex fori apply to the case.  Every unprecedented step taken by the High Court carefully laid 
a pathway to the forum’:  ‘Troublesome and Obscure: The Renewal of Renvoi in Australia’ (2006) 2 Journal of Private 
International Law 1,21 
33 Ernest Lorenzen ‘The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws – Meaning of the Law of a Country’ (1917) 27 Yale Law 
Journal 509,521: ‘The renvoi doctrine appears to be a mere expedient to which the courts resort in order to justify the 
 
The eccentricity of Neilson … might itself show what desperate measures judges are prepared to take to get to the lex fori34
 
This is seen, for example, in the judgment of Gleeson CJ who was satisfied with the extremely brief 
evidence of the Chinese legal expert in relation to the exercise of the Article 146 discretion to apply 
Chinese law.  The expert had never seen the exception being applied by the Chinese courts, but 
eventually agreed that it was possible that the discretion could be applied in this case.  This is taken by 
Gleeson CJ to be ‘barely sufficient but just enough’35 to support the view that the discretion would in 
fact be exercised.  Gleeson CJ fortified this view by considering that the Chinese court would apply the 
provisions of the Article in accordance with Gleeson CJ’s view of what was ‘just and reasonable’.  
Gleeson CJ then listed off a number of connecting factors showing that China had no real interest in the 
litigation.36  This was an interesting argument from a judge who had expressly disavowed the relevance 
of connecting factors in establishing the law to be applied to a torts choice of law issue in Australia.  
This is surely a difficult thing to do in the absence of any evidence that the Chinese courts did in fact 
apply a ‘proper law of the tort’ process, which is what Gleeson CJ applied.  Some members of the Court 
seemed very willing to assume that China would adopt a proper law process, when they had previously 
completely rejected such an approach as the relevant Australian position. 
 
Further evidence that the judges wished to apply the law of the forum appears in the judgment of 
Gummow and Hayne JJ, who were convinced that, quite apart from the scope and objects of the 
discretion mentioned in Article 146, ‘fairness and the justice of the case’ required that Australian law be 
applied to the dispute.37  They went on to justify this view by listing the connecting factors between the 
dispute and Australia.  These judges, together with Callinan and Heydon JJ, then made a very large 
assumption that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that foreign law is the same as the law of the 
forum.  With respect, it is highly ironic to make such an assumption, particularly in the area of the 
choice of law, whose raison d’etre is the reality that there are real differences in the laws of different 
nations/states. 
 
With respect, there is a much easier way to get to apply the law of the forum in this case, if it was felt 
necessary to administer ‘fairness and justice’.  That would have been by applying a ‘flexible 
exception’38 to the general rule that in cases of international torts, the law of the place of the wrong 
should be applied.39  Of the judges, only Callinan J explicitly mentioned this link, commenting 
reluctantly that  
                                                                                                                                                                         
application of their own law’; ‘renvoi implies a reversion pro tanto to the exclusive application of the local or internal law of 
the forum, a seizing of every opportunity on the part of the courts to apply their own law (528-529).   Even Larry Kramer, a 
supporter of the renvoi doctrine, observed that judges quickly recognised that accepting the renvoi could serve as a useful 
device to avoid forum choice of law rules and allow them to apply forum substantive law:  ‘Return of the Renvoi’ (1991) 66 
New York University Law Review 979, 997 
34 ‘Homing Devices in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches’ (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 839, 873. 
35 219 
36 Callinan J (in terms in which Heydon J agreed) expressed a similar list of factors. 
37 To quote the judges in direct terms (243), ‘whether regard is had to the scope and objects of the power or discretion, or 
regard is had, on the hypothesis identified, to fairness and the justice of the case, the conclusion available on the limited 
evidence led at trial is the same.  All parties to the dispute were Australian.  The only connection between the dispute and 
China was the place of occurrence of the tort.’  
38 The so-called flexible exception was developed by the House of Lords in Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356.  It allows 
displacement of the general choice of law rule in appropriate cases, such as where that rule does not refer the court to the law 
of the jurisdiction with the stronger connection with the parties and events.  For example, it may be that the general choice of 
law rule in tort is that we apply the law of the place of the wrong to resolve the dispute.  However, it may be that both parties 
to the dispute live in another country and otherwise have little connection to the place where the wrong allegedly occurred.  
In such cases, it might make little sense to apply the general rule of the law of the place of the wrong.  It is also known as the 
approach of the ‘proper law of the tort’. 
39 As Mortensen notes, ‘Neilson … show(s) how the rigidity of the Pfeiffer-Renault regime could backfire’: ‘Homing Devices 
in Choice of Tort Law: Australian, British and Canadian Approaches (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 839, 874; refer also to M Keyes ‘The Doctrine of Renvoi in International Torts: Mercantile Mutual Insurance v 
Neilson (2005) 13 Torts Law Journal 1,10 and A Lu ‘Ignored No More: Renvoi and International Torts in Australia’ (2005) 1 
Journal of Private International Law 35 
 
No matter which solution is adopted by Australian courts, the result will not be entirely satisfactory intellectually and in 
logic.  This does not stem wholly however from the unwillingness of the Court to recognise in Zhang what in hindsight might 
have resolved this case, a flexible exception in special circumstances of the kind which the second sentence of Article 146 … 
contemplates, but from the fact that absolute rules however apparently certain and generally desirable they may be, almost 
always in time come to encounter a hard and unforeseen case40
 
The author applauds Callinan J for at least acknowledging the obvious in this case, that the flexible 
exception would have been a useful tool here to deal with the issues raised.  That this is the case is 
hardly noteworthy41 – the reality that flexibility is required has been recognised in case law42 and 
legislation43 in Great Britain, and in case law in the United States44 and Canada,45 not to mention 
legislation in China.  Is a case where the place of the wrong is fortuitous or relatively unimportant really 
such a hard and unforeseen case, as Callinan J claims?  Surely the facts in Chaplin v Boys or Babcock v 
Jackson show that this situation is quite a common occurrence, surely making it untenable to apply a 
rule with no flexibility.  It is not surprising that the High Court has had to resort to another way to obtain 
the required flexibility, but with respect it is surprising that this was apparently not foreseen by the 
members at an earlier stage. 
 
The High Court had painted itself into a corner by its steadfast refusal to admit a flexible exception46 to 
the general rule.  In John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson,47 the court gave its reasoning that  
 
Adopting any flexible rule or exception to a universal rule would require the closest attention to identifying what criteria are 
to be used to make the choice of law.  Describing the flexible rule in terms such as ‘real and substantial’ or ‘most significant’ 
connection with the jurisdiction will not give sufficient guidance to courts, to parties, or to those like insurers who must order 
their affairs on the basis of predictions about the future application of the rule48
 
The High Court also adopted this approach in an international torts case,49 after conceding that in those 
cases ‘questions which might be caught up in the application of a flexible exception to a choice of law 
rule fixing upon the lex loci delicti in practice may often be subsumed in the issues presented on a stay 
application, including one based on public policy grounds.50  Kirby J reserved his opinion on the 
question whether a flexible exception existed in relation to international torts, but held the exception did 
exist.  Unfortunately, he did not refer to it, let alone apply it, in Neilson. 
 
Clearly in this case, the High Court’s concession in the previous paragraph was of no assistance, because 
the proceedings were brought in an Australian court, and the place of the wrong was an overseas 
country.  This surely is an indicator that the above test does not provide the kind of flexibility required in 
this area of the law.  However, there is no suggestion anywhere in Neilson that any of the judges would 
be prepared to revisit the inflexible rules laid down in the Pfeiffer decision.   
 
                                                 
40 277 
41 The author advocated the adoption of a flexible exception in Anthony Gray ‘Flexibility in Conflict of Laws Multistate Tort 
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Indeed, it is interesting to ponder what would have happened in this case if one thing were different.  
What would have happened if Article 146 of the Chinese General Principles had not mentioned that the 
law of another country could be applied to resolve the case?  Would the Australian judges then have 
been required to apply Chinese law, even though two of them suggested that fairness and justice 
required the application of Chinese law, and three of them could identify close connecting factors 
between Australia and the events?  It seems unlikely, given their narrow formulation of the forum non 
conveniens test, that the court would have declined to hear the case.  In other words, the escape device of 
renvoi will not always be available to allow the High Court to apply the law of Australia to such a 
scenario.  It is submitted with respect that the High Court should accept this case as a warning that its 
inflexible choice of law rules in this area are surely not tenable in the long run.   
 
(2) Interest Analysis and Renvoi 
This author has previously expressed a view that interest analysis should be used by the Australian High 
Court in deciding on the choice of law issue, at least in tort cases.51  Briefly, interest analysis involves 
considering whether the objectives for which a particular law was passed would be furthered by the 
application of the law in the current case.  It may be part of a ‘proper law of the tort’ approach, whereby 
a court assesses the connecting factors between the event/s in issue, and jurisdictions to which the parties 
have links.  A state would be ‘interested’ in having its law applied if application of its law to this dispute 
would promote the reasons for which the law was passed. 52  On the other hand, events might have 
occurred in a jurisdiction, about which the jurisdiction might have little interest, because for example the 
protagonists both live elsewhere, the jurisdiction’s insurance system is not affected by the outcome etc.  
There might be good reason thus for suggesting that the laws of that jurisdiction might not apply to 
resolve such as case, given that jurisdiction’s low interest in the outcome, or lack of connection to the 
outcome.53  It is logical then to consider what interest analysts might think of the renvoi doctrine, and 
what they might say about the Neilson litigation. 
 
In Neilson, some members of the Court seemed to flirt with interest analysis reasoning.  Gleeson CJ 
explained that the Chinese authorities were unaffected by the outcome of the litigation and no Chinese 
interests were involved, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ considered ‘connecting factors’ between 
China and the litigation, and Kirby J considered the issue but concluded Chinese interests were at stake 
in the litigation.54   
 
The discussion of interest analysis and renvoi below will necessarily focus largely on some American 
case law and scholarly writing, given the lack of consideration of the renvoi question in Australian and 
United Kingdom courts, the acceptance of interest analysis by some United States judges and scholars, 
and the legislative response to the question of proper law of the tort (and broadly interest analysis) in the 
United Kingdom.55 Having said that, in a recent English case Barros Mattos Junior v Macdaniels 
Collins J left open the possibility of the application of renvoi principles to assess an international 
restitution claim.  His Honour claimed that renvoi could be applied in such a case if  
 
The object of the English conflict rule in referring to a foreign law will on balance be better served by construing the 
reference to mean the conflict rules of that law.56
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an exceptional case in which a court would ascertain how a foreign court would decide the question (ie double renvoi), and 
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Though not identified as such, these comments can be read as being consistent with interest analysis. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, at least some of the interest analysts completely eschewed the renvoi doctrine.  As 
Currie said about the scenario where a foreign jurisdiction was ‘interested’ in the dispute where the 
forum was not, 
 
The problem of renvoi would have no place at all in the analysis that has been suggested.  Foreign law would be applied only 
when the court has determined that the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application  of its law and policy to the 
case at bar and that the forum has none.  Hence, there can be no question of applying anything other than the internal law of 
the foreign state … it seems clear that the problem of the renvoi would have no place at all in the analysis that has been 
suggested57
 
Currie reiterated this point in a later article.  He cited the case of Shaw v Lee,58 where a married couple 
from North Carolina had an accident in Virginia; the wife sued her husband in North Carolina.  That 
state had abolished interspousal immunity; Virginia had not.  North Carolina applied the place of injury 
rule (as Australia currently does), applying Virginian law and dismissing the action.  Suppose that a 
similar situation arises again, with the victim suing in a Virginian court.  The Virginian court is 
persuaded that Virginia has no interest in applying its immunity rule, but is referred to the decision in 
Shaw v Lee.  Currie’s solution to this case was that the Virginian court should ignore North Carolina’s 
choice of law rule and follow its own determination of North Carolina’s interest, applying North 
Carolina tort law.59
 
In a similar vein, Westen and others60 claimed that it was up to the forum to decide whether or not 
another state was properly interested in the facts at issue.  Kay, in discussing the Californian Supreme. 
Court decision to apply Ohio law in Reich v Purcell, claimed not to be impressed by the fact Ohio might 
not have applied its own law if the suit had been brought there.  She reasoned that the mere fact Ohio 
might mistakenly have failed to recognise her interests on her behalf should not preclude California 
courts from doing so.61  For this reason, choice of law rules of another jurisdiction should not be taken 
into account.   
 
With respect, it seems somewhat artificial to determine whether or not a foreign state is interested in 
litigation by referring only to its internal legal rules.62  In relation to the Neilson facts, could a court 
determine whether China was interested in the litigation by referring only to the internal rules?  The 
internal rules provided for compensation for damages in the event of injury caused by an infringement of 
rights.  There does not appear to be a specific statement in the Chinese law as to the reasons why the 
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General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC was passed.  It is submitted it would be difficult for a court, 
in the absence of a reference to China’s choice of law rules, to determine that country’s ‘interest’ in this 
litigation.63  It is much more sensible to refer to all of the Chinese law, including its choice of law rules, 
to gain a sense of the interest that China has in the outcome.  Here, the reference in Chinese law to the 
fact that where two foreigners from the same country are involved, the law of that country may apply, 
surely is a relevant factor to be taken into account, one which should influence the court in its 
assessment of the interests of various jurisdictions in the matter.  What stronger evidence could there be 
of a country’s interest in particular litigation than a statement in that country’s legislation that the law of 
another country might instead be relevant?  
 
Other writers have pointed to this apparent illogical position from some interest analysis scholars.  As 
Larry Kramer puts it 
 
Because choice of law is a process of interpreting laws to determine their applicability on the facts of a particular case, the 
forum can never ignore other states’ choice of law systems … On the contrary, the applicability of another state’s law must 
be determined in light of its choice of law system.  Hence, a proper understanding of choice of law means the return of the 
renvoi.64
 
As Kermit Roosevelt puts it, an approach that seeks to determine whether foreign law is intended to 
apply can hardly justify contradicting those provisions of foreign law that address applicability.65  As 
Chait puts it, ‘a State’s choice of law rules can be a highly effective indicator of that State’s interest in 
having its law apply to a dispute’.66
 
Secondly, Currie’s ‘solution’ to the factual scenario above also seems objectionable on the grounds that 
it encourages forum shopping.  Currie seems to be openly supporting a system where the result of the 
litigation would differ according to whether the action was commenced in North Carolina or Virginia.  It 
is submitted that one of the goals of a coherent system of choice of law rules is to minimise wherever 
possible encouragement of forum shopping.  The author cannot agree with Currie’s approach to renvoi. 
 
The United States Supreme Court found in Klaxon v Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co67 that a federal 
court applying state law was required to heed the limits set by that state’s choice of law rules.  In other 
words, to apply state law was to apply the entirety of state law, not merely the internal rules.  Further, 
the Second Restatement (Conflict of Laws), though it generally rejects the renvoi and advocates applying 
the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the events, recognises that an exception 
exists in cases where the objective of the particular choice of law rule is that the forum reach the same 
conclusion on the facts involved as would the courts of another state.  In other words, it implies that in 
considering whether foreign law should apply, its choice of law rules are relevant. 
 
Thirdly, it does seem somewhat inconsistent with the idea of judicial comity, not to say arrogant, for one 
court to expressly refuse to apply choice of law decisions made by another state or country on the 
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ground that the decision is incorrect (in the eyes of the forum court).  With respect, the whole point of 
choice of law rules is to rationally resolve situations where events have contact with more than one 
jurisdiction; it is not to pass judgment on the laws of another state.  Conflict of laws resolution is not 
assisted by a ‘my way is best’ or ‘your rules are no good’ approach.   
 
Of course, Currie does not speak for all interest analysis scholars.  Many adherents of this school of 
thought agreed, that at least in some cases, foreign choice of law rules should be taken into account.  
Examples of this appear in the work of Egnal and Seidelson.68  Others who view the foreign choice of 
law rule that refers the issue back to the forum take the reasonable view that the case presents a false 
conflict, that the foreign state has renounced its interest in the case.69  As Chait puts it 
 
If the end goal of interest analysis is to determine the interests of the competing State, then modern renvoi 
should play an indispensable role in determining those interests.  For a court to ignore a competing State’s 
choice of law rules is essentially to disregard perhaps the most important source of information as to whether 
or not the competing State has an interest in having its law applied to a suit.  Affording adequate consideration 
to the competing State’s interests results in consistent application of foreign law and subsequently in 
reciprocity, advancement of policies other than those behind domestic laws, and discouragement of forum 
shopping.  As a result, it would seem that renvoi is more than just useful in contemporary international choice 
of law – it is fundamental.70
 
Further, it is erroneous to assume that a State’s interests are confined to the application of its own laws.  
As Kramer has pointed out, a State’s interests should extend to comity towards other States, facilitating 
multi-state activity, and providing a legal regime whose enforcement is uniform and predictable.71
 
The facts of Gray v Gray72 provide a good forum to demonstrate the interplay between interest analysis 
and the principles of renvoi.  There a husband and wife were living in New Hampshire.  While driving a 
car in Maine, the wife was injured in an accident that was claimed to have been caused by the husband’s 
negligence.  Action was commenced in New Hampshire, with the defendant claiming that a Maine law 
prevented a wife from suing her husband.  The court simply applied this rule to reject the case, 
representing a simple example of application of the (internal) law of the place of the wrong. 
 
However, another approach might have been taken.  Analysis of the Maine statute above might divulge 
that the law was passed to apply only to Maine husbands and wives, to preserve domestic harmony in 
that state.  The Maine legislators had no interest in applying the law to out of state residents.  Here if the 
New Hampshire court had considered all of the law of Maine, it might have realised that Maine had no 
interest in the outcome of the case, and applied its own law to resolve the case.73
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The author submits that this is the correct approach to the above factual scenario.  There seems little 
point in a blind determination to apply the law of the place of the wrong, when the place of the wrong 
itself would not have applied its own law.  This is not forum-bias or an escape device to allow the law of 
the forum to be applied; it is a genuine attempt to find out what the ‘other’ court would do, and to 
respect that state’s interest or non-interest in the suit.  It is an effort to ensure the greatest uniformity of 
outcome possible in the area of choice of law. 
 
The renvoi principle was applied with interest analysis in a recent United States tort case, Phillips v 
General Motors Corp.74  There survivors of a Montana family killed in a car accident in Kansas while 
travelling from their home state to North Carolina sued the manufacturer.  The manufacturer, a 
Michigan-based corporation, manufactured the car in Michigan and sold it in North Carolina, where one 
the victims bought the car while living there.  Montana law was most favourable to the plaintiffs, 
allowing the action, barring certain defences available elsewhere, and not capping liability payouts.  
Kansas law barred the action, allowed the defendant certain defences, and capped liability. 
 
The court held Montana had a more significant relationship, and that its law should determine liability 
and damages.  The court reasoned, consistently with interest analysis, that the purpose of the Kansas law 
would not be furthered by its application here.  The court applied a double renvoi approach - it 
concluded that North Carolina had no claim to apply its law here, because under its choice of law rules, 
it would have applied Kansas law.  The court also found that Michigan law could not apply, based on an 
earlier statement of that state’s court finding the state had little interest in applying its own law when the 
only link to the state was the location of the manufacturer.75   
 
The author submits that interest analysis can be used to support referring to the full set of rules of 
another country in resolving a choice of law question.  All of a country’s legal rules should be taken into 
account in assessing whether and to what extent that country has an interest in the application of its laws 
to a given factual situation. 
 
(3) Criticisms of the Renvoi Can be Met 
Criticisms of the renvoi doctrine have certainly been many.  They tend to revolve around its supposed 
illogical nature.  This might be suggested based on an individual’s conception of the purpose of choice 
of law rules.  A scholar who believed that the purpose of choice of law rules was to indicate the mode in 
which a choice of law question must be solved would find renvoi problematic.76  However, as Griswold 
has indicated,  
 
What is the conflict of laws, unless it is a science for telling a court when it should cast aside its own rule in favour of one 
that is preferred abroad?77
 
Territorialists such as Beale were strongly against the doctrine,78 although one might question whether 
applying the choice of law rules of the place where the wrong occurred may in fact be more consistent 
with territorialism than its rejection.79  The author does not find arguments about an abdication of 
sovereignty convincing for that doctrine’ s acceptance in the choice of law area would surely rail against 
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the application of foreign law at all.80  It ignores that it is the law of the forum in the first instance that 
determines whether reference is made to the foreign law.  The author cannot agree with Lorenzen that 
application of the renvoi 
 
Implies a reversion pro tanto to the exclusive application of the local or internal law of the forum, a seizing of every 
opportunity on the part of the courts to apply their own law81
 
Of course, this only occurs when the foreign law refers back to the law of the forum.  The author agrees 
that forum bias must be avoided at all costs, but there is no need to avoid renvoi in order to achieve this 
end.  The problem of forum bias may, depending on the approach of the court, also taint interest 
analysis, a proper law approach, and a better law approach to resolving choice of law issues, leaving 
only the law of the place of the wrong as the available conflicts rule to be applied.  (Yet even it can be 
overruled based on public policy grounds).  Fewer than 10 of the United States adhere to the law of the 
place of the wrong as the choice of law to be applied in multi-state tort cases, and it has been abandoned 
by most jurisdictions around the world.  The problem of forum bias is an ever-present one in the conflict 
of laws, and it is not ‘solved’, as Lorenzen would have us believe, by rejecting the renvoi. 
 
The author does not accept it is too difficult to determine the foreign rules, especially in the 21st 
century.82  The old rule, applied by the High Court in this case, that foreign law is presumed to be the 
same as Australian law, and that Australian courts know no foreign law, can be seen for the anachronism 
it is.  As Martin notes, it also has great potential to undermine the High Court’s newly fashioned choice 
of law rules in tort 
 
The presumption about foreign law undercuts the underlying intention of the Zhang rule by providing the plaintiff with 
a positive incentive simply to ignore foreign law, unless it is in some way more favourable than Australian law … That 
is an invitation to forum shopping, if ever there were one …No-one who wanted to rely on a proposition of English law 
in an argument to an Australian court would think of calling expert evidence about English law and if pressed, an 
Australian court would surely feel comfortable taking judicial notice of English law.  Is Australia still so parochial that 
it cannot treat other foreign laws in the same way?83
 
As Professor Briggs said, ‘to insist that the foreign law must be completely proved, failing which it will 
be wholly discarded, is to make the best the enemy of the good’.84
 
The possible problem of the circulus inextrabilis is accepted, and some way must be found to resolve 
this problem.  The author cannot improve on the suggestion that we should stop after the reference back 
ie if in the case of Neilson, the law of China would have referred back to Australia, the Australian court 
should accept the reference back and apply its own law.85  This approach is also suggested by Griswold: 
 
If we get into a situation where there is an endless series of references, there is no logical reason for stopping 
after the second reference (or ‘accepting the renvoi’); it would be just as logical to stop after the third 
reference or the seventeenth.  But by the same token, it is no more logical to stop after the first reference 
(reject the renvoi).  It may or may not be expedient to stop there for one reason or another, but a solution 
reached on this ground cannot be accorded the accolade of logic.86
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In other words, there is no easy answer to this difficulty, and logic does not assist us to determine the 
matter.  It is submitted that other considerations, such as judicial comity and respect for the legal 
principles of another jurisdiction, together with interest analysis, however favour the suggested solution. 
 
Reference to the areas in which renvoi is accepted more readily may assist us in meeting concerns about 
renvoi.  For example in the case of In Re Baines,87 an English decedent left land in Egypt.  The land was 
sold and the proceeds brought to England.  The decedent’s will was valid according to English law, but 
invalid by Egyptian law.  Egyptian choice of law rules stated that succession to land was governed by 
the law of nationality, and an Egyptian court would hold succession to be governed by the internal law 
of England.  The court upheld the validity of the will under English law.  This seems to the author to be 
the correct outcome.  There would have been no merit in this case in applying Egyptian law and holding 
the will to be invalid, as rejection of renvoi would have required.  Egypt clearly had no interest in the 
outcome of the case, and upholding the will clearly would not have offended any Egyptian legal 
principles. 
 
Property was also in issue in the case of In Re Schneider.88  Schneider died in New York as an American 
citizen of Swiss origin.  His will disposed of Swiss property in a way that was ineffective according to 
Swiss law.  A New York court was asked to decide under which jurisdiction the estate should be 
administered.  The court accepted the renvoi by referring to the entire law of Switzerland, including its 
choice of law rules.  Pointedly, the court did not decide the case as one involving immovable property 
and so a recognised exceptional case requiring the application of renvoi.  It preferred to cast its decision 
on a broader footing, specifically allowing future cases to accept or reject a general principle of renvoi.  
 
In the case of Armitage v Attorney-General,89 a woman was domiciled in New York with her husband.  
She travelled to South Dakota, obtaining a divorce in that state.  She later married an Englishman, and 
the issue arose as to the validity of this marriage.  In legal proceedings in an English court, the validity 
of the earlier divorce was relevant.  The evidence was that the divorce would be recognised as valid in 
New York, although the divorce was not valid according to the (internal) law of New York.  The court 
then determined the validity of the divorce as the New York court would have, upholding the later 
marriage.  Again this seems the right outcome; there would have been nothing to be gained by rejecting 
the renvoi and applying New York law to invalidate the divorce, when a New York court in the same 
case would not have done so.  No New York policy was offended by the recognition of this divorce. 
 
It is submitted that the application of renvoi in these cases has achieved the ‘correct’ result.90  Why then 
is the orthodox view that renvoi is acceptable in these areas, but not in others?  In the recent Australian 
case of O’Driscoll v J Ray McDermott, SA91 McLure J was prepared to assume that the Neilson renvoi 
approach extended to contracts, and suggested that it could extend to ‘other sources of conflict’, which 
might well mean all substantive areas in which choice of law questions arise.  Gummow and Hayne JJ in 
Neilson also suggest that the renvoi principle might be of general application,92 though they do not 
commit to a general model, preferring the law in this area to develop incrementally. 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission, in its review of the Australian choice of law rules, largely 
dismissed the renvoi doctrine but, with respect, little justification is offered.  The Commission stated: 
 
Even at the international level it is difficult to justify renvoi from a doctrinal point of view.  For every 
justification there appears an equally compelling counter-argument.  Its only justification is a pragmatic one.  
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It helps to resolve problems that arise from the fact that different legal systems apply different connecting 
factors93…To prevent the problems of renvoi arising within Australia, the Commission recommends that it 
should not apply and that in the legislation implementing (the Commission’s recommendations) the word ‘law’ 
should be defined to mean the internal or domestic law94
 
The author would submit in response that there is further justification for a renvoi approach rather than 
mere pragmatism, including respect for legal principles of another jurisdiction, and application of 
interest analysis.  It is hard to justify the forum court applying foreign law, when the foreign court itself 
would not have applied its own law.  This is a clear invitation to forum shopping. 
 
(4) Supposed Special Case Regarding Immovable Property and Status 
As indicated, the American Law Institute in both of its Restatements on the Conflict of Laws take the 
general position that renvoi is rejected, except in relation to land and marital status.  The influence of 
Lorenzen,95 who regarded general acceptance of renvoi as tantamount to an abdication of sovereignty, 
on the development of the First Restatement has been noted.96
 
A more detailed justification of the exceptions appears in an article by Cormack in the following terms: 
 
It has been recognised throughout the world as peculiarly fitting that matters of property should be 
governed by the law of the situs, and matters of status by the law of the domicile.  As to them a forum 
which is not itself the situs or the domicile makes no attempt to apply its own principles of justice – its 
only desire is to recognise the title to the property as it is at the situs, or the status as it is at the domicile.  
Not only does this accord with the forum’s senses of justice and fitness, but it would be singularly 
ineffective for the forum, in the relatively few cases in which matters relating to foreign property or status 
are presented to it, attempt to apply a different rule from that existing at the situs or the domicile.  Any 
such attempt would evidence a remarkably narrow public policy upon the part of the forum.  In keeping 
with this line of thought, the forum will follow the conflict of laws rule of the jurisdiction of situs or of 
domicile… Use of the renvoi doctrine with matters of property and of status makes for certainty, because 
… of the universal agreement upon the basic propositions stated, which are of the utmost practical 
importance … In the absence of such agreement … there is no increase in certainty through adoption or 
rejection of the renvoi doctrine.97
 
The influential conflicts scholar Beale, a territorialist and opponent of the general acceptance of the 
renvoi theory, put it in these terms: 
 
Because of the paramount social importance of treating the existence of marriage, for instance, in the same 
way in all states, the law of the forum attempts to bring about a warranty of such treatment by providing in its 
law for a decision of the question in the way that the law, which in its opinion is the proper law would 
determine it; not because of any effect given to that law but simply as the rule adopted by the law of the forum 
for the determination of such problems.  The same argument applies to a determination of the title of foreign 
land; it being essential to the protection of the interests of all parties that such a title should be determined 
everywhere as the state of situs would determine it since that state alone must have the final authority. 
 
The author concedes that given the universal recognition of the conflict rules regarding immovable 
property and status, the argument for the application of renvoi here is strongest.  However, it is 
submitted that the rationale for applying renvoi in these cases can be extended to the application of 
renvoi in other fields, in particular the field of personal liability in tort.  As indicated, recently McLure in 
the Australian case of O’Driscoll v J Ray McDermott, SA98 McLure J assumed that the Neilson renvoi 
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95 Lorenzen ‘The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws – Meaning of ‘The Law of a Country’ (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 
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approach extended to contracts, and suggested that it could extend to ‘other sources of conflict’, which 
might could mean all substantive areas.  Gummow and Hayne JJ in Neilson also suggest that the renvoi 
principle might be of general application,99 though they do not commit to a general model, preferring the 
law in this area to develop incrementally.  There is certainly no indication in the Neilson judgments that 
the doctrine should or would be confined only to the torts context, and nor is there any obvious reason 
for doing so. 
 
Note the words Cormack uses above.  In talking about immovable property and situs, he says, 
(emphasis added) that as to them a forum makes no attempt to apply its own principles of justice.  
This statement is taken to imply that in other fields involving choice of law questions, including 
tort, a forum is seeking to apply its own principles of justice.  In Australia, the courts did initially 
accept that the forum could apply its own principles of justice in assessing multi-jurisdictional 
tort claims.  The court adopted the rule in Phillips v Eyre, requiring for the claim to succeed that 
it was actionable by the law of the forum.  However, eventually the Australian High Court 
abandoned the rule, requiring the application of the law of the place of the wrong, without 
reference to the law of the forum.  In other words, the Australian court does not ‘attempt to apply 
its own principles of justice’ to the case.  It applies the law of the foreign jurisdiction, provided it 
does not offend the public policy of the forum.100  The author concludes that one of the 
arguments in favour of only applying renvoi to immovable property and status cases does not 
apply in the Australian context. 
 
The circularity involved in Beale’s rejection of renvoi is well documented.  He is determined that 
in relation to land, the state of the situs must have the final authority.  This is consistent with 
territoriality, but the same could be said in relation to the facts in Neilson.  Surely as a 
territorialist, Beale should advocate that Chinese law ‘must have the final authority’.  And it 
seems bizarre to say the least that we should ignore which law the Chinese themselves would 
apply to resolve the case.  Why is this not part of the ‘authority’ of China?  It seems most 
especially bizarre when as in Neilson the substantive liability rule and the choice of law rule 
appear in the same Act.  The author could never agree with an outcome where part only of an Act 
is applied, without reference to the context in which it was written.  It is submitted that the 
Chinese choice of law rule does provide the context in which the substantive rule appears. 
 
Beale is concerned about the equality of treatment of marital status, and so is willing to ask how 
the ‘proper law’ would determine it, including referring to its choice of law rules.  The author 
suggests that as a general principle there should be as much equality of treatment in choice of 
laws rules as possible, recognising that complete equality is impossible.  As some members of the 
High Court explicitly recognised in Neilson, one way to seek to ensure the greatest equality 
possible is for the forum court to consider, if it is applying foreign law, how the foreign court 
would apply that law (and indeed, whether the foreign court itself would apply its own foreign 
law or the law of another country).  Equality of treatment is not only a worthy goal in the area of 
status.   
 
(4) Examples Where Renvoi Was Applied in the Non-Exceptional Areas 
Given that renvoi-type situations do not occur regularly, and even when they do the 
consequences may not be realised, there are not many cases where renvoi has been applied 
outside of the so-called exceptional cases.  It is not surprising the High Court did not refer to any 
tort cases where a renvoi approach had been applied, in its judgment in Neilson.  However, some 
support for the doctrine appears in some contract law cases.   
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The contract case101 of University of Chicago v Dater102 is one example.  There a note was 
signed in Michigan by a married woman.  The note was then sent to Illinois for placement of a 
mortgage on the written register.  The money was then advanced in Illinois by the lender.  The 
mortgage was later foreclosed in Illinois, with an action brought in a Michigan court to recover 
the balance due on the note.  The internal law of Michigan provided that a married woman could 
not be bound by a signed note, while by the law of Illinois a married woman could freely 
contract.  The majority of the court found that the wife’s capacity was governed by the law of the 
place of contracting, which was decided as Illinois. 
 
The court then asked what an Illinois court would do in such a case.  They found that such a court 
would hold that the wife’s capacity was governed by the internal law of the place of execution.  
According to this law, the wife was not liable.  On the basis that an Illinois court would find the 
wife not liable, the Michigan court found the wife not liable.  Three members of the court 
dissented in the case, rejecting the renvoi. 
 
In this case there was no circulus inextrabilis.  The place of contracting had no interest in the 
application of its law in this case.  It would not have sought to apply its own law; as a result the 
forum court should not seek to apply what would otherwise be the ‘proper law’.  There is no 
difficulty about forum shopping.  If the action had been commenced in Illinois, the court would 
also have been referred to the law of the place of contracting, which remained Illinois.  It would 
have applied its choice of law rules, reflecting that Illinois had no interest in the outcome of the 
case.  Similarly, Michigan law would have applied.   
 
As indicated, in the 2006 Australian contract case of O’Driscoll v J Ray McDermott, SA103 
McLure J accepted without deciding that renvoi could apply to a contract case.  This was also the 
position of Walsh J, speaking for the New South Wales Full Court in Kay’s Leasing Corp v 
Fletcher.104  Of course, renvoi cannot arise in British contract cases, due to its express exclusion 
by legislation.105  However, Collins J was prepared to consider the doctrine in the recent quasi-
contract case of Barros Mattos Junior v MacDaniels,106 at least where the object of the British 
conflict rule would better be served by referring to the choice of law rules of the other 
jurisdiction. 
 
Conclusion 
The author agrees with the end result in Neilson, if not all of the steps taken to get there.  In 
particular, the author reiterates that the radical acceptance of the renvoi doctrine was forced upon 
by the Court by its refusal to acknowledge a flexible exception to its recently re-crafted choice of 
law rules in tort.  The author would much rather that the court accept a flexible exception as other 
jurisdictions have seen the need to do.  However, given the current High Court’s apparent 
antipathy towards such a suggestion, it is submitted to be correct that the High Court applied 
Australian law in this case, given the lack of interest China apparently had (subject to matters of 
evidence of Chinese law, which admittedly were not entirely satisfactory in this case).  The 
author is in favour of explicit interest analysis and sees the doctrines of renvoi and interest 
analysis as compatible.  Consideration of how the Chinese court would presumably have dealt 
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with the matter is important to minimise the opportunities available for forum shoppers, and to 
provide as much consistency and predictability as possible.  It is an important thing to do to 
promote judicial comity and respect for legal systems other than our own.   
 
On the assumption that a Chinese court would have remitted the matter back to an Australian 
court to apply Australian law, the author agrees that Australian law should be applied (as it was) 
to resolve the case.  However, proof of foreign law is important, and the author cannot agree with 
presumptions that foreign law is the same as local law, or that statutory interpretation is the same 
in the two jurisdictions.  It is submitted that appropriate evidence must be sought and pleaded on 
these matters before the case can be resolved.  Australian law should move to accept the doctrine 
of renvoi as a general principle.  It should not apply the doctrine only in isolated areas, as has 
been advocated by the American Law Institute, because the raison d’etre of the doctrine is not 
confined to one or two substantive topics.  It is believed that interest analysis might be used to 
construct the theoretical framework on which renvoi as a general principle could be placed. 
 
